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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890119-CA 
v. t 
JANERO D. ROMERO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. t 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly found that the 
confidential informant's %report discovered after trial was not 
sufficient to establish grounds for a new trial? 
2. Whether defendant failed to raise the issue of 
perjured testimony below and should be precluded from raising it 
for the first time on appeal? 
3. Whether the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding 
the lesser offense of possession were fairly based on the 
evidence and not misleading to the jury? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant provisions are set forth in the text of 
the brief and need not be restated here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Janero D. Romero, was charged with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 
(Supp. 1988), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1988) (R. 1-2). Defendant was convicted of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance by a jury on October 6, 1988, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, presiding (R. 47). Judge 
Roth sentenced defendant to a prison term not to exceed five 
years. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 31, 1988, police informant Shauna Mains 
arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant through Terry Schmidt 
(T. 89). Shauna subsequently called Detective Gard of the Roy 
City Police Department and informed him of the proposed buy (T. 
103). Detective Gard met Shauna at a nearby 7-11 store parking 
lot, gave her $225.00 in cash which he had xeroxed, and put a 
wireless listening device in her purse (T. 91, 103-104, 106). 
Detective Gard followed Shauna back to her house with other 
members of the narcotics task force (T. 106). Approximately five 
minutes later, Schmidt arrived in a van with Lou Burns (T. 91-92, 
106). Shauna gave Schmidt the money and told him she wanted to 
go with him to make the buy (T. 92). Schmidt took her to the 
defendant's house, but told her she had to wait in the van with 
Burns (T. 93-94, 100-102, 107). After approximately 20 minutes, 
Schmidt returned with the cocaine (T. 94-95, 107). Detective 
Gard and the others from the task force followed the van back to 
Shauna's house (T. 108). After Schmidt and Burns left, Shauna 
turned over the cocaine to Detective Gard (T. 98, 108). 
Detective Gard then returned to defendant's house, and 
between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., observed between six and eight 
vehicles arrive and stay for short periods of time (T. 109, 119-
120). At least two times, Detective Gard 6aw defendant come out 
of the house and walk up to the cars that had arrived (T. 109). 
This information was used to obtain a search warrant of 
defendant's house the following day (T. 111). Shauna's 
handwritten report was subsequently placed in the police file 
assigned to the Schmidt cocaine buy (R. 76-77). 
The police executed a search warrant on defendant's 
house about noon on September 1, 1988 (T. 123). Present at the 
time of the search was defendant, his daughter, and her friend 
Tracy (T. 115). Defendant was taken into custody and read his 
miranda rights (T. 115, 132). Defendant told Sergeant Wells that 
he owned the house and that he lived there with the two girls (T. 
87). 
A search of defendant's home produced nine baggies of 
cocaine found under a flowerpot on the back porch and 
approximately $1750.00 in cash found in a plastic bag in 
defendant's bedroom between his mattress and waterbed frame (T. 
66-68/ 112-113f 181/ 295). The serial number on one of the 
$20.00 bills matched Detective Gard's xeroxed copy of the 
controlled buy money Shauna had used the day before to purchase 
the cocaine (T. 114). When questioned about the $20.00 bill/ 
defendant stated that he had no idea how it got there (T. 116). 
Defendant volunteered to police that a barrel in the 
basement contained a white substance found by him at the dump (T. 
129-130/ 236/ 286). Defendant claimed he did not know what the 
white substance consisted of (T. 236-237/ 275). Police searched 
the basement and found a 21 pound bucket containing a white 
substance later analyzed and identified as approximately 
$1700.00-1800.00 of inositol/ a cocaine-cutting agent (T. 148, 
163). Police also found a magazine in defendant's room with 
squares cut out of it (T. 116). Detective Gard testified that 
this type of paper is used to hold cocaine because it is almost 
water resistant (T. 117). 
Tracy, who had lived with defendant for nearly two 
years and treated him as her father, told police that the cocaine 
c 
was hers and that she was selling it because her mom did not give 
her any money (T. 177, 212). Defendant told her to be quiet/ 
that she did not have to say that/ and that everything would be 
all right (T. 285). At trial/ Tracy admitted that she did 
receive money from her mother and others and that she had lied to 
the police because she did not want defendant to go to jail (T. 
188-195/ 212/ 219 ). She further claimed at trial that she was 
holding the cocaine for one of her boyfriends who was in trouble 
with the police (T. 182# 185). She said that she had not seen 
the boyfriend since defendant was arrested and believed he went 
back to California (T. 182, 197). 
At trial, defendant corroborated Shauna and Detective 
Gard's testimony by admitting that Schmidt had been at his house 
the day before the arrest at about 5:00 p.m. and that he stayed 
approximately 20 minutes (T. 267-271). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
new trial based on defendant's claim of newly discovered 
exculpatory evidence. The confidential informant stated in a 
report provided to police that she saw her contact Schmidt enter 
a red house with yellow trim. Because this report had been 
placed in another case file and forgotten, it was not provided to 
defendant through discovery prior to trial. Defendant claims 
that the informant's statement was exculpatory and warrants a new 
trial because his house has brown trim. However, the statement 
merely goes to the credibility of the witness and the weight to 
be afforded her testimony. Generally, impeachment evidence is 
considered insufficient to warrant a new trial. In any event, 
the newly discovered statement is insubstantial and unlikely to 
produce a different result in light of the totality of the 
evidence. The informant identified a photo of defendant's house 
at trial and her testimony was corroborated by other evidence 
presented at trial. 
Defendant failed to raise the prosecutor's alleged 
knowing use of perjured testimony in the trial court below and 
may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. In any 
event, the standard for reviewing a conviction obtained by the 
knowing use of perjured testimony is whether there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the perjury could have affected the 
jury's verdict. In the present case, the alleged perjury is 
nothing more than a "minor discrepancy" regarding the 
confidential informant's perception of the color of trim on 
defendant's house. The color of trim was not material to 
defendant's guilt or innocence nor is there any evidence in the 
record to establish that the confidential informant actually 
testified as to the color of the trim on defendant's house. 
Defendant claims that the prosectitor improperly 
commented on the legal standard for the lesser offense of 
possession. In fact, the prosecutor merely pointed out that if 
the jury believed defendant's story that he was not selling 
drugs, the jury could still consider whether defendant was guilty 
of illegal possession of drugs. The jury was clearly instructed 
on the non-evidentiary status of closing arguments and the 
necessary elements of Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
Further, the term "possession" was defined for the jury. In 
light of the fairly based comment by the prosecutor and the clear 
jury instructions, the jury could not have been confused or 
misled by the prosecutor's comment at closing argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE. 
After trial, a handwritten report created by the 
confidential informant, Shauna Maines, was discovered at a 
forfeiture hearing in a police file with a case number assigned 
to the Schmidt case. Because the report had been placed in 
another case file and forgotten, it was not provided to defendant 
through discovery prior to trial. Defendant now claims that 
because his house has brown trim, the house with "yellow trim" 
described by Shauna in the report does not fit the description of 
his house (Br. of App. at 3). He claims that the trial court 
erred in denying his Motion for New Trial based on the newly 
discovered exculpatory evidence. Defendant's claim should be 
rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "the 
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion 
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985). The Court has further explained that it is a 
"matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to 
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence." State v, Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d 
438, 439 (Utah 1973). A trial court's decision "will be deemed 
an abuse of discretion only in such instances where there is a 
grave suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of 
the lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new 
evidence will supply" Id. at 439-440. In other words, M[i]f 
there be evidence before the court upon which reasonable men 
might differ as to whether or not the defendant is guilty, the 
trial court may deny a motion for a new trial." Ld. at 440. 
Three criteria must be met in a motion for a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. These are: (1) that 
the evidence is material and newly discovered, (2) that using due 
diligence it could not have been discovered prior to trial, and 
(3) that the evidence is substantial enough that, with it, there 
might have been a different result. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 
P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, the newly discovered evidence 
consisted of a prior inconsistent statement of the confidential 
informant. Such evidence merely goes to the credibility of the 
witness and the weight to be afforded her testimony. Impeachment 
evidence is generally considered insufficient to warrant a new 
trial. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. 
Myers, 534 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In Myers, the court held 
that: 
Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to 
impeach the credibility of a prosecution 
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to 
justify a,new trial, . . . particularly when 
the newly discovered evidence would be "only 
an additional part of a cumulative attack on 
the witness' credibility." 
Meyers, 534 F.Supp. at 756 (citations omitted) quoting, United 
States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 946 (1982). See also, Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 
1, 9 (1956). 
In the instant case, the newly discovered evidence is 
insubstantial and unlikely to produce a different result when 
compared to the totality of the evidence. Detective Gard 
corroborated Shauna's testimony that Schmidt entered defendant's 
house to purchase cocaine (T. 107). At trial, Shauna identified 
defendant's house in a photograph as the house Schmidt entered to 
make the cocaine buy (R. 77) (Br. of App. at 2). Even defendant 
himself testified that Terry Schmidt entered his house that day 
(T. 267-271). In light of the overwhelming and uncontested 
evidence that defendant's house was the location of the 
controlled purchase, the confidential informant's inconsistent 
statement regarding the color of trim on defendant's house is not 
sufficient grounds to justify a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also clarified the standard 
in determining whether exculpatory evidence was not disclosed by 
the prosecution: 
[a] fair-minded prosecutor is not likely to 
be aware of all potential evidence which 
defendant may think relevant, and we do not 
think it reasonable, given the adversary 
nature of the criminal process, to require a 
prosecutor to disclose all evidence which 
might possibly be useful to the defense but 
which is not likely to have a foreseeable 
effect upon the verdict. Such a requirement 
would create unbearable burdens and also 
uncertainties with respect to the finality of 
judgments." 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980). Similarly, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that Ma prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence 
and evidence that is 'BO clearly supportive of a claim of 
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to 
produce.'M United States v. Agursf 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) 
(emphasis added), quoted in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 
(Utah 1980). However, a new trial is not justified if there is 
no reasonable doubt about guilt even considering the additional 
evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113-114. 
In the present case, the additional evidence merely 
raised doubts about the color of trim on defendant's house. It 
does not, however, raise any significant doubts about the strong 
evidence supporting the jury's finding of guilt. In light of the 
overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction and the 
insubstantiality of the alleged exculpatory evidence, this Court 
should find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE IN 
THE TRIAL COURT, HE CANNOT NOW CLAIM ON 
APPEAL THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED 
PERJURED TESTIMONY. 
Defendant further claims that the prosecutor knowingly 
used the perjured testimony of Shauna Mains (Br. of App. at 5). 
His claim is again based on the apparent inconsistency regarding 
the color of trim on defendant's house. Defendant's claim is 
wholly without merit and should be rejected. 
It must be first pointed out that defendant raises the 
issue of perjured testimony for the first time on direct appeal. 
(R. 54-56; Supplement to Motion for New Trial.) It is well-
established that an appellate court will not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 
252 (Utah 1982). Accordingly, this Court should not consider 
defendant's unpreserved claim. 
In the event this Court reaches the merits of 
defendant's claim, defendant's claim must fail. The Utah Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court have clearly identified 
the standard of review regarding a claim of a prosecutor's 
knowing use of perjured testimony. A conviction obtained by the 
knowing use of perjured testimony will not be upheld if it is 
shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjury 
could have affected the jury's verdict. United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 
1984). No actual knowledge of the perjury on the part of the 
prosecutor is necessary so long as the prosecutor should have 
known of the perjury, Aqurs, 427 U.S. at 103. However, it must 
be acknowledged that "[ejvery lawyer, indeed every intelligent 
layman, recognizes that minor discrepancies may occur in 
statements made by one person at different times." State v. 
Jarrell# 608 P.2d 218, 227 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the alleged perjury is nothing 
more than a Mminor discrepancy" regarding the confidential 
informant's perception of the color of trim on defendant's house. 
The color of trim on defendant's house was not material to the 
determination of defendant's guilt or innocence, particularly 
where it was undisputed that defendant's house was the location 
of the alleged criminal acts. Further, there is nothing in the 
record to establish that the confidential informant actually 
testified as to the color of the trim on defendant's house. 
Thus, no perjury exists and no error occurred. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
WAS FAIRLY BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT 
CONFUSING OR MISLEADING TO THE JURY. 
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor's 
rebuttal comment during closing argument was improper because the 
prosecutor incorrectly stated the law to the jury. He argues 
that as a result of the remark, defendant may have been convicted 
without a finding of actual possession of a controlled substance. 
In order for defendant to successfully argue error 
based on prosecutorial misconduct, he must show some degree of 
demonstrable prejudice. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 
(Utah 1988), on reconsideration, 773 P.2d 631 (1989). The Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether 
a prosecutor's remark warrants reversal; "(1) did the remarks 
call to the attention of the jurors matters which they could not 
properly consider in determining their verdict, and (2) were the 
jurors under the circumstances of the particular case probably 
influenced by those remarks." State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 
(Utah 1986). Under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedures, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded.- This Court should not reverse a conviction unless 
the error "is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a different result." State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 
313, 316 (Utah 1980). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
"'[cjounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their 
[closing] arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss 
fully from their stand points the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom.'" State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 
1255, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (1973). Additionally, a curative jury instruction is 
generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment 
by the prosecutor. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1982); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, defendant alleges that an improper 
statement was made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument. 
The following statement occurred: 
If this doesn't convict him, you have a 
lesser included in there of simple 
possession. Based upon the Defendant's 
testimony, which he denies, I told Tracy to 
get it out of the house last week. I don't 
know, if you are going to give him credit for 
that, then I suppose—and you can find him 
guilty of simple possession, because he 
wouldn't be possessing this stuff to sell. 
And if you don^t think that this was based on 
the facts of putting it all together that 
this cocaine was being—was being held there 
was part of the cocaine that's being sold, 
was in fact sold, then I guess you will not 
find element two or three of the main charge 
we have, possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute. If you have any 
problem with the key words, why just read the 
Instructions. The Judge gives you a whole 
list of definitions just for your 
edification. So possession of it. And part 
two, he is possessing it to put into the 
stream of commerce, so to speak. 
(T. 65) (emphasis added). Respondent submits that the comment 
made by the prosecutor was within the wide latitude afforded 
-11-
counsel to comment on the evidence. The comment was not 
misleading where the prosecutor simply pointed out that if the 
jury believed defendant's story that he was not selling drugs, 
they could still consider whether defendant was guilty of 
possession. Id. He referred the jury to the instructions and 
suggested they pay particular attention to the definitions 
provided. J^ d. The evidence strongly supported a theory of 
possession where the cocaine was found on the porch of 
defendant's house and the cash, including the $20.00 bill from 
the police buy money, was found in defendant's bedroom between 
defendant's waterbed mattress and bed frfiime (T. 74, 87, 112-114). 
It should be further noted that the trial judge 
submitted several instructions to the jury which would have a 
curative effect on the claimed error. Id. The trial judge 
instructed the jury that statements made by counsel during the 
trial were not evidence and the jury was not to consider them as 
such (R. 29; Jury Instruction No. 1). The jury was also 
instructed on the elements of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance With Intent to Distribute, or, if all of the elements 
were not met, the lesser charged offense of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (R. 33-34; Jury Instruction No's. 5-6). 
The term -possession" was defined for the jury to mean Mto have 
possession of or to'exercise dominion or control over tangible 
property. It may mean either joint or individual ownership or 
control." (R. 38; Jury Instruction No. 9.) 
As noted earlier, a curative jury instruction is 
generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment 
by a witness or counsel. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1982). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this 
Court -must assume that the jurors were conscientious in 
performing to their duty, and that they followed the instructions 
of the court.M State v. Hodgesf 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 
1324 (1974); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978). 
In light of the fair subject matter of the comment, the 
strong evidence of possession, and the clear instructions 
presented to the jury, this Court should find that the 
prosecutor's comment was not confusing or misleading to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests this 
Court to affirm defendant's conviction. . 
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